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We describe a large-scale linear programming model for optimizing strategic (intercontinental) airlift capability. The model routes cargo
and passengers through a speciﬁed transportation network with a given ﬂeet of aircraft subject to many physical and policy constraints.
The time-dynamic model captures a signiﬁcant number of the important aspects of an airlift system in a large-scale military deployment,
including aerial refueling, tactical (intracontinental) aircraft shuttles, and constraints based on crew availability. The model is designed to
provide insight into issues associated with designing and operating an airlift system. We describe analyses for the U.S. Air Force system
concerning ﬂeet modernization and concerning the allocation of resources that affect the processing capacity of airﬁelds.
In a large-scale military deployment, massive amountsof equipment and large numbers of personnel must be
transported over long distances in a short amount of time.
Airlift, sealift, and ground transportation assets are all used
to execute such a deployment. In the Persian Gulf War,
sealift moved 85% of the dry cargo, but the ﬁrst ships
did not arrive for weeks. Strategic (intercontinental) air-
lift played the dominant role in rapidly moving troops and
cargo in the important weeks leading up to the war. (See
Lund 1993 for more details of strategic airlift in the Persian
Gulf War.) In this paper, we describe a linear programming
model that is primarily focused on the airlift system, and
we indicate some of the insights it has provided U.S. Air
Force (USAF) planners.
Application of optimization modeling to problems in
transportation has a rich history. Ferguson and Dantzig
(1955) describe a linear programming model for assign-
ing aircraft to routes. In a linear programming model for
tanker routing, Dantzig and Fulkerson (1954) introduce
the notion of a time-space network. This time-space con-
struct plays a key role in many time-dynamic optimization
models (see, for example, Potts and Oliver 1972) includ-
ing the one developed in this paper. Optimization methods
have been successfully applied to a variety of problems in
the commercial airline industry; see, for example, Teodor-
ovic (1988) and Yu and Thengvall (1999). The nature of
the planning problems faced by decision makers in the
civilian airlines and military airlift differ substantially. For
example, military airlift requirements are largely driven
by infrequent events that can be of enormous magnitude,
while the airlines face demands over time that are consid-
erably less variable. Airlines can choose which markets to
serve and have the freedom to determine ﬂight frequency
while airlift planners do not have this type of control, but
in many instances, military planners have greater control
over the transportation network infrastructure. A number
of simulation-based military mobility models are reviewed
in Schank et al. (1991), yet there is a dearth of literature
on military airlift optimization. The optimization model we
describe in this paper routes cargo and troops through a
Subject classiﬁcations: Military logistics: optimizing strategic airlift. Large-scale linear programming: multiperiod air transportation model for cargo and passengers.
Area of review: Services and Military.
Operations Research © 2002 INFORMS
Vol. 50, No. 4, July–August 2002, pp. 582–602 582
0030-364X/02/5004-0582 $05.00
1526-5463 electronic ISSN
Baker, Morton, Rosenthal, and Williams / 583
transportation network with a given aircraft ﬂeet, subject
to numerous physical and policy constraints. It is not the
purpose of the model to provide operational ﬂight schedule
recommendations. Instead the purpose is to provide insight
into tactical and strategic issues concerning the airlift sys-
tem. Some of the issues that our model has been used to
examine include allocating resources that govern the pro-
cessing capacity of airﬁelds, examining which route options
are best for speciﬁc aircraft and war scenarios, assessing
the relative performance of different mixes of aircraft types,
evaluating investment (or divestment) decisions in airﬁelds,
recommending ﬂeet modernization strategies, and studying
roles and concepts of operations for aerial refueling aircraft.
Our model is the result of a joint effort between research
teams (then) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and
the RAND Corporation; it is called NPS/RAND Mobility
Optimizer (NRMO). As implied by its name, NRMO has
a distinct lineage from each of its namesakes. NRMO was
developed from two previous models at NPS and a model
at RAND, drawing on their best features and learning
from their shortcomings. Figure 1 overviews the NRMO
predecessors.
Optimization of airlift mobility at NPS began with the
Mobility Optimization Model (MOM), a project for the
Joint Staff’s Force Structure Resource and Assessment
Directorate (see Wing et al. 1991). MOM is a time-dynamic
model that includes both airlift and sealift assets, but has a
single-channel topology, and hence is not designed to cap-
ture the airlift system’s transportation network. THRUPUT
is a time-static strategic airlift model on a general rout-
ing network that was developed by Yost (1994) at the U.S.
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) in the
Pentagon. Then, AFSAA desired a time-dynamic model
with the ability to route aircraft through a general net-
work and asked NPS to combine the features of MOM and
Figure 1. This ﬁgure summarizes the genealogy of the
models that led to NRMO. For each model
we indicate the developers and the relative
merits labeled as “+” (advantages) and “−”
(disadvantages).
MOM (1991)
Joint Staff (Wing, Sherwood, Rice)





+ general network topology
- time static
THRUPUT II (1994-96)
NPS (Rosenthal, Morton, Lim, et al.)
+ time dynamic, general topology,
   unit resolution for cargo
- no aerial refueling, no crews,
   no transshipment options
CONOP (1994-95)
RAND (Killingsworth, Williams)
+ time dynamic, general topology, 
   aerial refueling, crews, transshipment
- no unit resolution for cargo
NRMO (1996-present)
NPS (Rosenthal, Baker, Morton) & RAND (Williams)
+ time dynamic, general topology, unit resolution for cargo,  
   aerial refueling, crews, transshipment
THRUPUT in one model. This request led to THRUPUT II,
ﬁrst described in an NPS master’s thesis (Lim 1994), and
then extended in Morton et al. (1996). An ongoing rela-
tionship between AFSAA and NPS led to several M.S. the-
ses that examined stochastic airlift models (Goggins 1995),
route generation techniques (Turker 1995), route prioriti-
zation (Toy 1996), and aggregation schemes (Fuller 1996).
THRUPUT II also served as a real-world test problem for
the development of a solution methodology for large-scale
staircase linear programs, described in Baker (1997) and
Baker and Rosenthal (1998).
In 1995, a team of students and faculty at NPS, guided
by military analysts at AFSAA, used THRUPUT II to
help decide whether to buy the (then) McDonnell-Douglas
C-17, or a freighter version of the Boeing 747 as the next-
generation USAF airlifter. Ultimately, the C-17 was chosen.
Our analysis supported this conclusion: The modiﬁed 747
ﬂeet performed slightly better than the C-17 ﬂeets, because
the 747s carry more bulk and oversized cargo at a longer
range, freeing the C-5s to deliver almost exclusively out-
sized cargo. However, this improvement was deemed insuf-
ﬁcient to overcome the C-17’s advantage with respect to
combat ﬂexibility. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated
a need for modeling in-theater and air-refueling operations,
as well a need for a more parsimonious model formula-
tion that could do similar analyses with fewer variables and
constraints (Rosenthal et al. 1997).
In parallel with the THRUPUT II modeling efforts at
NPS, a group at RAND developed a similar model called
Concept of Operations (CONOP) with RAND’s Project Air
Force funding. The CONOP model captures many details
not incorporated in THRUPUT II: aerial refueling, ﬂow bal-
ance and utilization constraints for air crews, options for
direct delivery versus delivering cargo that is subsequently
transshipped by in-theater aircraft, and optional in-theater
recovery bases, where aircraft may receive services and
crew changes. On the other hand, CONOP does not offer
sufﬁcient resolution with respect to ownership (the associ-
ated military unit) of the cargo being delivered.
Killingsworth et al. (1994) used CONOP to conduct an
investigation of the utility of aerial refueling tanker air-
craft within the strategic air mobility system. The study
found that using air refueling to support a large deploy-
ment results in some additional costs, but often substan-
tially shortens the overall time to complete the delivery.
Aerial refueling increases cargo throughput most during the
earliest stages of the deployment, before the capacity of
the enroute system has been expanded. Finally, the study
concluded that the difference in marginal costs between
aerial-refueling and traditional cargo-hauling concepts of
operation is greatest for smaller cargo movements. How-
ever, these types of movements are often characterized by
urgency and the desire for quick delivery, and also have
lower costs that may make them affordable under the cir-
cumstances.
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CONOP was also used to support the C-17 Tactical
Utility Analysis study, conducted by the Ofﬁce of the
Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation
(Killingsworth and Melody 1995). Unlike older strategic
airlift aircraft, the C-17 can operate out of smaller and
more austere airﬁelds, permitting their intra-theater use.
The C-17 can also be used to deliver strategic loads closer
to the battleﬁeld. CONOP found that some level of C-17
presence in-theater was usually recommended, and that
direct delivery to small airﬁelds was generally preferred.
As with the THRUPUT II analysis, the robust capability
of the C-17 justiﬁed its procurement as the next-generation
USAF airlifter.
CONOP’s ability to examine alternative delivery strate-
gies and THRUPUT II’s ability to track cargo ownership
were merged with the development of NRMO. In addition
to incorporating all the important capabilities of these pre-
vious models, NRMO provides for input commonality with
existing models used by USAF analysts. Legacy optimiza-
tions of airlift were either limited to modeling airlift with-
out real-world complexities such as aerial refueling and
transshipment, or did not capture the unit level of detail
required by senior decision makers. Previous models were
also hampered by the data-gathering morass associated with
any large model; NRMO interfaces very easily with the
15,000-line input ﬁles of existing models at the USAF’s
Air Mobility Command.
In this paper, we give an overview of NRMO in §1, and
then give a detailed mathematical description of the linear
programming model in §2. NRMO has been designed to
provide insight on several types of mobility questions con-
cerning investment (or divestment) in airﬁeld infrastructure,
selection of airlift aircraft for acquisition, and the best use
of dual-role aircraft. Several studies have been performed
and some of the most important of these are discussed
in §3.
Table 1. A small portion of a TPFDD document, when modiﬁed for NRMO use, lists the key movement requirements
for each unit in the contingency: (1) unit name, (2) onload location (a K preﬁx denotes a US base), (3) ofﬂoad
location (an RK preﬁx denotes a Korean base), (4) forward operating location (when appropriate), (5) available-
to-load date, (6) required delivery date, (7) the number of short tons of bulk, oversized, and outsized cargo,
(8) the number of passengers, and (9) the categorized type of unit owner.
Line ID Onload Ofﬂoad Forward Load Required Bulk Oversized Outsized Passengers Owner Type
UNIT1486 KBLV RKPS 10 24 292 1009 59 0 9
UNIT1487 KWRI RKPS 10 24 116 349 35 0 23
UNIT1488 KTIK RKPS 10 24 6 9 2 0 2
UNIT1489 KTCM RKPK RKTD 10 24 0 0 15 0 5
UNIT1490 KTIK RKPS 10 24 0 41 85 0 5
UNIT1491 PAEI RKPS 11 24 0 110 5 19 2
UNIT1492 KSUU RKPK RKPP 11 24 133 32 7 59 18
UNIT1493 KTIK RKPS 11 24 29 764 9 0 18
UNIT1494 PHIK RKPS 11 25 63 182 7 0 18
UNIT1495 KSUU RKTY 11 25 634 562 880 0 4
UNIT1496 KDOV RKJK 11 25 220 208 212 0 1
UNIT1497 KTIK RKSO RKSG 11 25 0 190 83 402 1
UNIT1498 KHOP RODN 11 25 47 44 12 44 1
UNIT1499 KLFI PHIK 11 25 0 0 0 1876 2
UNIT1500 KOFF PHIK 11 25 0 0 0 814 2
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT
AND MODEL OVERVIEW
Our goal is to move equipment and personnel, in a
timely fashion, from a number of origin bases through a
transportation network to destination bases using a ﬂeet
of aircraft with differing characteristics. Such a deploy-
ment is driven by the movement requirements speciﬁed in
the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The
TPFDD contains a highly detailed list of cargo and troops
that are required by contingency plans for a given theater
of operation (Armed Forces Staff College 1993). For our
purposes, the movement requirements may be viewed as a
list of requirement line identiﬁcations, or line ids, each of
which speciﬁes the associated cargo’s onload and ofﬂoad
bases, the day it is ﬁrst available to move, the day by which
it must be delivered, the number of short tons (stons) in
each of three cargo classes called bulk, oversized, and out-
sized, and the number of passengers. Bulk cargo is pal-
letized on 88×108 inch platforms. Oversized cargo is non-
palletized rolling stock, and is larger than bulk. Outsized
cargo is also nonpalletized and represents the largest cargo
class. The TPFDD also speciﬁes the cargo’s organizational
unit type (helicopter squadron, tank company, etc.) from
which we derive an approximate loading efﬁciency for each
aircraft type. For example, ammunition is dense cargo that
can be loaded with little wasted space, but helicopters are
large, light, and irregularly shaped, thus they use cargo
space less efﬁciently. In addition, some types of cargo can
be loaded more efﬁciently on certain aircraft. Finally, after
arriving at the ofﬂoad base some line ids require subse-
quent delivery to a forward operating location, and in such
cases, the TPFDD also lists the associated forward operat-
ing base. (Some aircraft can bypass the ofﬂoad base and
deliver cargo and troops directly to a forward location.)
Table 1 contains a small portion of a representative TPFDD
that has been modiﬁed for use in NRMO.
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Table 2. Aircraft used or considered by the USAF for strategic airlift have widely dif-
fering capabilities. Some are variants of civilian aircraft; others are of pure
military design. Note that aircraft ranges are stated for the given capacity,
but the model actually uses a more detailed range-payload curve (Figure 2).
The table’s data is from Air Mobility Command (1997).
Capacity Range
Name Manufacturer (stons) (nm) Comments
C-5A/B Lockheed 110 2,400 Outsized Cargo
C-17A Boeing and 86 2,250 Outsized Cargo
McDonnell-Douglas
C-141B Lockheed 37 2,500 Oversized Cargo
747F Boeing 122 4,500 Oversized Cargo
Not bought by USAF
KC-10 McDonnell-Douglas 45 5,000 Military DC-10 Air Refueler
KC-135 Boeing 28 5,500 Various 707 modiﬁcations
The ﬂeet of aircraft consists of several types of planes,
and the ﬂeet mix varies depending on the type of analysis
being done. A brief summary of some of the ﬂeet’s air-
craft is provided in Table 2. Aircraft differ in what they can
carry, where they can go, and what sort of functions they
can perform. The C-5 and C-17 can carry all cargo types
as well as troops, while the C-141 can carry troops, bulk,
and oversized cargo. Tanker aircraft such as the KC-10
and KC-135 serve as aerial refuelers, but can also func-
tion as strategic lifters, carrying bulk cargo and troops.
Variants of the Boeing 747 can carry bulk and oversized
cargo, or passengers. The C-17 can ﬂy into austere envi-
ronments that are inaccessible by other strategic airlifters.
Each aircraft is also deﬁned by a number of characteris-
tics, including airspeed, average (maximum) ﬂying hours
per day, cargo- and passenger-carrying capacity, a range-
payload curve, service times and airﬁeld capacity consumed
at onload, enroute, and ofﬂoad bases, and aerial refueling
capability. A range-payload curve speciﬁes the maximum
payload that an aircraft can carry given the desired range.
Range-payload curves for four representative airlift aircraft
are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3 depicts many of the key features of the under-
lying transportation network in NRMO. Cargo and troops
are carried from aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) to
the theater on strategic airlift aircraft. The theater con-
tains aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), forward operat-
ing bases (FOBs), and beddown bases for in-theater aircraft
shuttles. A line id’s cargo and troops depart from a spec-
iﬁed APOE and may require delivery to either an APOD
or an FOB. Strategic airlifters make deliveries to APODs
and certain aircraft, such as the C-17, can also make deliv-
eries directly to FOBs. Cargo destined for an FOB can
also be dropped at an APOD by a strategic lifter and then
transshipped to the FOB, either by an in-theater shuttle
or via ground transportation. Multiple routing options are
typically available to the theater. For example, a mission
departing from the lower APOE in Figure 3 can either go
through the depicted enroute base, or for appropriate air-
craft, can ﬂy nonstop to the APOD by in-ﬂight refueling
from a tanker aircraft. In general, routes may contain mul-
tiple enroute bases. Routes from an APOE to the theater
are called delivery routes and routes from the theater to
an APOE are called backchannel routes. We further distin-
guish between direct delivery routes (to an APOD or FOB)
and transshipment routes (to an APOD), which then require
subsequent ground or shuttle delivery to an FOB. Because
recent US military strategy mandates the capability to ﬁght
in two nearly-simultaneous major regional contingencies
(alternatively known as major theater wars), some studies
have two theaters.
One important aspect of the airlift system not captured
in Figure 3 concerns the notion of a recovery base. NRMO
contains two types of delivery routes: quickturn routes and
standard routes. In a standard route, maintenance opera-
tions, crew changes, refueling, and other routine service
procedures are performed at the destination base, in addi-
tion to ofﬂoading the aircraft. In a quickturn route, the
aircraft is ofﬂoaded, and only minimal servicing is pro-
vided at the destination. The aircraft then departs for a
Figure 2. These range-payload curves for four air-
lift aircraft indicate the maximum payload
(stons) that an aircraft can carry when ﬂying
a given number of nautical miles. The piece-
wise linear curves are constructed by using
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Figure 3. This ﬁgure depicts a number of the key components of the airlift transportation network including aerial
ports of embarkation (APOEs), enroute bases, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), forward operating bases
(FOBs), in-theater shuttle beddown operations, and aerial refueling operations.
(presumably less busy) recovery base in the theater where
it receives a much fuller range of services, and usually a
crew change, before continuing on its backchannel route to
an APOE. We distinguish between quickturn and standard
routes because they consume airﬁeld capacity differently.
An aircraft, such as a KC-10, may begin the deploy-
ment as an aerial refueler based at a tanker beddown air-
ﬁeld. After the initial days of the deployment, the KC-10
may then ﬂy to an APOE, change roles, and begin deliv-
ering cargo and troops to the theater. Role changes of this
type may occur throughout the deployment both between
the strategic airlifter ﬂeet and the tanker ﬂeet and between
the strategic airlifter ﬂeet and the tactical in-theater shut-
tle ﬂeet. This type of ﬂexibility is attractive because the
goal of some studies is to investigate the value of dual-role
aircraft, i.e., aircraft that can serve as aerial refuelers and
strategic lifters or aircraft that can serve as both tactical in-
theater shuttles and strategic lifters.
Each type of aircraft has its own set of crews, and crews
are not interchangeable between different aircraft ﬂeets.
Flow balance constraints are maintained for crews at a sub-
set of the airﬁelds called crew stage bases. Stage bases are
placed along routes so as not to violate crew duty days; typ-
ically, crews are assured 12 hours rest after at most 16 hours
on duty. When performing tanker or shuttle missions the
crews stay with their planes. Crews within the strategic ﬂeet
are allowed to “deadhead,” i.e., they can move from one
crew-stage base to another with an appropriate time delay
before they become available to ﬂy. Crews need rest and so
there are more crews than aircraft; a typical ratio is 3 to 1.
The primary decision variables in NRMO specify the
number of aircraft missions for each line id, for each
aircraft type, via each eligible route, in each time period.
These include direct delivery and transshipment missions
on standard and quickturn routes. Separate decision vari-
ables track the time-dynamic delivery of the number of
short tons of each line id’s equipment in each cargo class.
Additional variables account for backchannel missions, in-
theater shuttle ﬂights, and the use of tankers to perform
aerial refueling. A set of inventory variables specify the
number of aircraft of each type at each base acting in
the strategic role as well as the shuttle and tanker roles,
and another group of variables allow appropriate aircraft to
move between these roles. Finally, decision variables also
account for the number of rested crews for each aircraft
type at each stage base and the number of crews deadhead-
ing between stage bases in each period. Based on informa-
tion from the TPFDD, each line id has a time window in
which delivery is permitted. The objective is to minimize
a weighted sum of penalties for late and nondelivery plus
secondary terms that measure system performance. The
model’s constraints can be grouped into seven categories
that govern demand satisfaction, ﬂow balance of aircraft,
cargo, and crews, aircraft delivery capacity for cargo and
passengers, the number of shuttle and tanker missions per
period, initial allocations of aircraft and crews, the usage
of aircraft of each type, and aircraft handling capacity at
airﬁelds.
To better facilitate understanding of the mathematical
model presented in the next section, we give additional
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details on some modeling techniques we use. When tanker
aircraft change roles they do so between an APOE and
a tanker beddown base. We do not model each possible
movement because there are a large number of such pairs.
Instead all tanker reassignments are made through a ﬁcti-
tious central tanker control point that we refer to as the
tanker “cloud.” Approximate time delays for changing roles
(and geographical locale) are incorporated in travel times
to the cloud. Reassignments as a tanker aircraft from one
tanker beddown base to another are also modeled by trav-
eling through the tanker cloud. Not all aerial refueling
attempts are successful, and in NRMO, a speciﬁed fraction
of aerial refueling missions are penalized with a time delay
and consume airﬁeld capacity at a so-called divert base.
In order to reduce the number of ﬂow balance constraints
at airﬁelds in the theaters, we perform an aggregation. Each
theater has one ﬁctitious centrally-located “super node.”
Flow balance of strategic airlifters arriving to a theater is
maintained at its super node and not at each individual
APOD and FOB. Surprisingly little resolution is lost by
using this modeling construct. While routes terminate in the
network at a super node, decision variables for delivering
cargo are indexed by the line id the aircraft is delivering and
each line id has a known destination. As a result, we can
enforce airﬁeld capacity constraints at each destination and
transshipment airbase in the theater, even though aircraft
balances are maintained only at the aggregate super nodes.
In practice, the airﬁelds in a theater tend to be in close
proximity so little is lost by not maintaining precise travel
times. This aggregation is performed only for APODs and
FOBs in the theater. Flow balance is maintained at each
APOE and enroute base.
2. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
The following sections describe the sets, data, decision
variables, and ﬁnally the mathematical formulation for
NRMO. The mathematical model is relatively complex, and
as a result there is substantial detail in the presentation.
However, a basic understanding is very accessible by ﬁrst
examining the decision variables and then the constraints,
referring to the data deﬁnitions as needed. That said, much
of the effort in formulating such a model concerns the elim-
ination of inadmissible combinations of indices. For exam-
ple, using i for line id, a for aircraft type, r for route, and
t for time, XDiart denotes the number of aircraft of type a
directly delivering line id i on route r departing at time t.
In order for the i a r t	-tuple to exist for XDiart ,
• Route r must be a direct delivery route with the correct
origin and destination for line id i.
• Aircraft of type a must be able to ﬂy the critical
(longest) leg on route r with a certain minimal payload.
• The start time t of the mission must be after line id
i’s available-to-load date.
• The delivery time, given that the mission starts at t,
must be on or before the required delivery date.
• Aircraft a must be capable of carrying some cargo
type (bulk, oversized, outsized, or passengers) that line id
i contains.
• Aircraft of type a must be available by time t at r’s
origin.
This is just one example of the restrictions on allowable
combinations of the indices. In the mathematical formula-
tion, such restrictions are captured by deﬁning appropri-
ate subsets for indices. For example, we use RDiadir to
denote the subset of direct delivery routes that can be ﬂown
by aircraft of type a carrying cargo and/or passengers for
line id i. Because correctly restricting such combinations of
indices is so essential for formulating a correct and com-
putationally tractable model, we have decided to present
such index restrictions via subsets in some detail. NRMO is
implemented with the algebraic modeling language GAMS
(Brooke et al. 1992) and solved with the CPLEX software
(CPLEX 1993). The screening of index combinations in
GAMS is accomplished with restriction operations that cor-
respond closely with the sets deﬁned below.
Like most mathematical programming formulations of
continuous-time systems, NRMO uses an approximation
based on discrete time periods. The length of a period in
this discretization is typically 12 or 24 hours. Decision
variables governing aircraft missions, such as XDiart dis-
cussed above, are deﬁned using these discrete time peri-
ods. However, parts of the model incorporate time at a
ﬁner level of detail. For example, rtrvar denotes the time
(in units of periods) that it takes an aircraft of type a to
travel from the origin to the destination of route r . And,
trvar is simply rtrvar , rounded to the nearest integer. In
the model, if an aircraft of type a begins ﬂying route r in
period t then it arrives at its destination in the integer period
t+ trvar . However, NRMO also contains a constraint that
keeps track of “aircraft-hours” consumed by using the real-
valued travel time, rtrvar . Similarly, within the discrete-
time model aircraft utilize airﬁeld capacity for fractions of a
period, and the required delivery dates for cargo and troops
need not be in integer periods.
2.1. Sets
Sets of Time Periods
T = all time periods 12     T .
TWi = delivery time window for line id i; a subset of
contiguous periods from T .
Tu = set of time periods associated with a utilization
rate enforcement block, each block is typically 20 days,
with a 10 day overlap between adjacent blocks.
U = utilization rate enforcement blocks.
FT =ﬂowtimeperiods{1    maximummission time}.
Sets of Line Ids
I = all line ids for delivery (from the TPFDD).
Ifob = subset of line ids whose destination is an FOB.
Ibdst = subset of line ids that have base b (FOB or
APOD) as a destination.
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Ib trn = subset of line ids that have APOD b as a trans-
shipment node.
Ib sup = subset of line ids that are to be delivered to
theater (super node) b.
Sets of Cargo Types
C = all cargo types {bulk, oversized, outsized, pax
(troops)}.
CC = cargo types excluding passengers {bulk, over-
sized, outsized}.
Ca = subset of cargo types that can be carried by air-
craft a.
Sets of Aircraft Types
A= all aircraft types.
Ac = subset of aircraft types that can carry cargo
type c.
Apax = subset of aircraft types that can carry troops.
Amix = subset of aircraft types that can carry troops and
at least one other cargo type (bulk, oversized, or outsized).
Atkr = subset of tanker aircraft types.
Arfl = subset of aircraft types that can be refueled by
a tanker.
Achp = subset of aircraft types that can serve as shuttles
and hence be “chopped” to the theater.
Sets of Bases
B = all real and virtual bases (APOEs, APODs, FOBs,
super nodes, enroute bases, beddown bases, and aerial refu-
eling points).
Bsup = subset of bases that are super nodes.
Be = subset of bases that are embarkation nodes.
Barp = subset of bases that are aerial refueling points.
Btkr = subset of bases that are beddown bases for
tankers.
BSrec = subset of super nodes that have at least one
recovery base.
BSbdwn= subset of super nodes that have b as the shut-
tle beddown node.
BAbtkr = subset of Barp that are served by b ∈ Btkr .
BTbarp = subset of Btkr that serve b ∈ Barp.
Bcrw = subset of bases that serve as crew stage bases.
Sets of Routes
R= routes.
RD = delivery routes.
RB = backchannel routes.
RBrec = subset of backchannel routes that include a
recovery base.
RDb = delivery routes that use base b.
Rbori = routes whose origin is base b.
Rbdst = routes whose destination is base b.
RDiadir = subset of routes that can be ﬂown by a and
carry i for direct delivery.
RDia trn = subset of routes that can be ﬂown by a and
carry i for transshipment.
RBab = subset of backchannel routes that use b and can
be ﬂown by a.
RDbdiv = set of delivery routes that have b as a divert
base for a failed aerial refueling attempt.
RBbdiv = set of backchannel routes that have b as a
divert base for a failed aerial refueling attempt.
While there are a large number of sets and subsets, we
try to use revealing naming conventions. For example, Ibdst
is the subset of line ids that have base b as their destination,
and RBab is the set of backchannel routes that can be ﬂown
by aircraft of type a and use base b.
2.2. Data
Travel Time Data
hrsper = number of hours per period.
rtrvar = actual travel time (ground times included) for
aircraft a to traverse route r (periods).
trvar = travel time (ground times included) for aircraft
a to traverse route r (integer periods).
etrvabr = travel time for aircraft a to reach base b when
ﬂying route r (integer periods).
rttrvab = tanker a’s real travel time from base b
(either embarkation or tanker beddown) to the tanker cloud
(periods).
ttrvab = rounded rttrvabr (integer periods).
ctrvabr = trvar plus crew rest (integer periods).
cttrvab = ttrvab plus crew rest (integer periods).
dhtrvb′b = travel time for crew deadheading from b′ to
b (integer periods).
gtrvi = in-theater ground travel time for i (periods).
msntimearf = time ﬂown f periods into a mission
(hours).
= hrsper if rtrvar > f (mission continues
throughout its f th period).
= 0 if rtrvar < f − 1 (mission terminates
before its f th period).
= hrsper · rtrvar − f − 1		 if f − 1 
rtrvar  f (mission terminates during its f th period).
Demand-Related Data
rddi = required delivery date (periods) for line id i.
demic = demand for line id i of type c (stons for bulk,
oversized, and outsized cargo; number of passengers for
pax).
latepeni = late delivery penalty for i per day per ston.
nogopeni = nondelivery penalty for i per ston.
Data Related to Airﬁeld Capacity and Its Consumption
gtimeabr = ground time for aircraft a at base b when
ﬂying route r (hours).
qtimeabr = ofﬂoad time only for aircraft of type a at
base b when ﬂying quickturn route r (hours).
sgtimeab = ground time for shuttle aircraft a at base b
(hours).
acpkgab = airﬁeld capacity service slots consumed by
aircraft a at base b.
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mogb = airﬁeld capacity service slot hours per period
at b. The smallest airﬁeld capacity at the bases along a
route limit the aircraft ﬂow along that route. (This value
is more restrictive than the capacity of the route’s airspace
separation requirements.)
mogeff b = airﬁeld capacity efﬁciency at b.
Data Related to Aircraft Capacity
purecapiac = number of stons of line id i’s cargo of type
c that can be loaded on plane a for a ﬂight of approximately
3,200nm (i.e., a loading efﬁciency).
maxpaxa = maximum number of troops that can be
loaded on an aircraft of type a.
rangefaciar = proportion of a type a aircraft available
for loading when ﬂying route r for line id i. This param-
eter is derived from the longest leg of route r , combined
with the range-payload characteristics of aircraft a, and the
loading efﬁciency of line id i. If the payload of aircraft a
on route r is less than purecapiac (using a weighted average
of cargo types c for the speciﬁed i) then rangefaciar < 1.
paxfraca = proportion of a type a aircraft’s capacity
that can be loaded with troops.
fuelgalsb = gallons of fuel available per period at
base b.
fuelabr = fuel required by aircraft a at base b when
ﬂying route r .
daysfuelab = daily fuel required by shuttle or tanker
aircraft at base b.
Data Associated with Aerial Refueling
tkreqvsabr = proportion of a full tanker’s fuel consumed
by aircraft a refueling at aerial refueling point b on route r
(KC-10 equivalent).
tkrpropabb′ = proportion of a full tanker (KC-10 equiv-
alent) available when a is a refueler at aerial refueling point
b′ and is bedded at base b.
tkrrateabb′ = maximum number of tanker shuttles to
aerial refueling point b′ per period for a tanker of type a
when it is bedded at b.
dpcta = proportion of aerial refueling attempts by air-
craft a (the one getting the fuel) that fail.
Intratheater Shuttle Data
initchopab = initial number of aircraft of type a
assigned to shuttle duty in theater (super node) b.
shutrateia = maximum number of shuttles per aircraft
of type a per period when carrying line id i’s cargo.
Aircraft Utilization Data
uratea = number of hours per day that aircraft a can
ﬂy.
flttimearf = in-ﬂight time only for aircraft type a on
route r , f periods into a mission (hours).
tkrtimeabb′ = in-ﬂight time for tanker a ﬂying from b
to b′ and back (hours).
shuttimeia = in-ﬂight shuttle time for aircraft type a
carrying line id i (hours).
Other Data and Notation
restrewa = small unit reward for resting aircraft a at
base b ∈ Be.
usepena = usage penalty for theater aircraft and tanker
reassignments.
newacat = number of new aircraft of type a available
in period t.
cumacat = cumulative aircraft available of type a by
period t (=∑t′t newacat′ ).
dhpena = penalty for deadheading crews.
crewrata = ratio of available crews to aircraft a.
·	 = indicator function; 1 if argument is true and 0
otherwise.
x	+ = positive part operator; =max0 x.

S = complement of set S.




XDiart = number of aircraft a direct delivering i on
standard (nonquickturn) route r departing at time t.
XTiart = number of aircraft a delivering a transship-
ment load of i on standard (nonquickturn) route r departing
at time t.
XDRiart = number of aircraft a direct delivering i on
quickturn route r departing at time t.
XTRiart = number of aircraft a delivering a transship-
ment load of i on quickturn route r departing at time t.
XSiat = number of (roundtrip) shuttle missions of air-
craft a delivering i in t.
Yart = number of aircraft a departing at t on backchan-
nel route r .
TKRAabb′t = number of (roundtrip) tanker missions of
type a ﬂown between b ∈ Btkr and b′ ∈ Barp in t.
Aircraft Inventory Variables
RONabt = number of aircraft of type a in inventory at
base b ∈ Be in period t.
RONTabt = number of aircraft of type a in inventory at
b ∈ Bsup without recovery in t.
RONRabt = number of aircraft of type a in inventory at
b ∈ BSrec with recovery in t.
IRONTab = number of aircraft of type a initially
assigned to b (nonrecovery).
IRONRab = number of aircraft of type a initially
assigned to b (recovery).
THCHOPabt = number of aircraft assigned to super
node b’s shuttle ﬂeet from nonrecovery routes in t.
THCHOPRabt = number of aircraft assigned to super
node b’s shuttle ﬂeet from recovery routes in t.
TKRBabt = number of tankers a whose beddown base
is b ∈ Btkr in t.
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Aircraft Changing Roles
ALLOCabt = number of new aircraft a allocated to b ∈
Be in t.
TKRECabt = number of tankers a leaving b ∈ Be in t
for service as a refueler (to cloud).
TKRCEabt = number of tankers a leaving tanker ﬂeet
(from cloud) in t for b ∈ Be for cargo hauling.
TKRBCabt = number of tankers a leaving b ∈ Btkr in t
for reassignment or service as a cargo hauler (to cloud).
TKRCBabt = number of tankers a being reassigned
(from cloud) in t to b ∈ Btkr for refueling.
Cargo
DTONSiact = stons of i’s cargo of type c direct deliv-
ered by a that will arrive in t.
TTONSiact = stons of i’s cargo of type c for transship-
ment by a arriving (at the transshipment node) in t.
STONSiact = stons of i’s cargo of type c shuttled by a
in t.
GTONSict = stons of i’s cargo of type c that will arrive
by ground at the FOB in t.
NOGOic = stons of i’s cargo of type c not delivered.
Crews
SCREWSabt = number of rested strategic airlift crews
available for aircraft a at base b ∈ Bcrw at the beginning of
time t.
DHCREWSab′bt = number of deadheading crews for a
leaving b′ at time t for reassignment to b.
Each of the above decision variables is constrained to
be nonnegative. In NRMO, all of the decisions are mod-
eled using continuous decision variables. Ideally, many of
the decisions (e.g., those involving numbers of aircraft mis-
sions) would be constrained to take integer values, but such
a model would be computationally intractable. It is pos-
sible to construct a feasible integer solution by “rounding
down” a fractional solution, since fewer missions use fewer





































































The ﬁrst three terms of the objective penalize deliveries
that arrive after the required delivery date for cargo arriv-
ing directly (1a), by shuttle (1b), and by ground (1c). The
unit penalty increases in proportion to the number of days
late, provided the arrival date is within the delivery win-
dow. Term (1d) penalizes nondelivered cargo. The objec-
tive also includes secondary terms that discourage: planes
being left in the theater in shuttle ﬂeets (1e), reassigning
planes between delivery and tanker ﬂeets (1f), and dead-
heading crews (1g). A small reward (1h) encourages planes
to remain at an APOE, as this is often in the continental US
and near their home station. The penalty (and reward) struc-
ture is such that late delivery is preferred to nondelivery but
neither will occur if there are sufﬁcient resources to achieve
on-time delivery. In practice, delivery “requirements” are
typically aggressive and difﬁcult to fully achieve. An elas-
tic formulation with opportunities for late and nondeliv-
ery allows analysts to discover when, and which, resources
are being fully utilized. While NRMO does not explicitly
model uncertainty, the idea behind providing a small reward
for keeping planes in inventory at an APOE is that they
are then well-positioned to respond to unforeseen contin-
gencies, as well as undergo unforeseen repairs.
















= demic ∀ i ∈ I c ∈ C (2)
For each line id and cargo class (bulk, oversized, out-
sized, and troops) deliveries that arrive directly, and if the
destination is a forward operating base, by shuttle and
ground must equal the demand or be counted as nondeliv-
ered cargo. It may be desirable to prevent “early” deliveries
because, for example, it is anticipated that the associated
cargo will not yet be ready for loading. This information
is provided in the TPFDD via each line id’s available-to-
load date. Similarly, deliveries past a certain point in time
(possibly later than the “required” delivery date, rddi) may
be useless. Such situations are captured by appropriately
deﬁning the time window TWi, since cargo is counted as
being delivered in (2) only if it arrives at a period in the
delivery time window.
Baker, Morton, Rosenthal, and Williams / 591
2.6. Flow Balance Constraints


























+ALLOCabt+a ∈ Atkr 	 · ,TKRCEabt-
∀a ∈ A b ∈ Be t ∈ T  (3)
The terms on the left-hand side of the equation rep-
resent all the ways that an aircraft of type a can depart
an embarkation base b in period t: planes leave the base
for transshipment and direct deliveries on both standard
and quickturn routes, dual-role tanker aircraft can depart
the base in order to join the aerial refueling ﬂeet, and
aircraft can remain on the ground until the next period.
The right-hand side of the equation represents available
aircraft including inventoried aircraft from the previous
period, planes that have arrived along a backchannel route
or from the tanker ﬂeet, and newly allocated aircraft. Note
that Yar t−trvar denotes the number of aircraft of type a ﬂy-
ing backchannel route r that depart from theater at time
t− trvar and hence arrive at base b at time t.






























+t=1	·IRONRab ∀a∈A b∈BSrec t∈T  (5)
A super node is a surrogate for all of the bases in a
theater. Aircraft ﬂow balance constraints are enforced at
super nodes, but other resources, such as airﬁeld capac-
ity, are modeled at individual bases. In constraints (4) and
(5), aircraft depart the theater along backchannel routes, are
inventoried, or are reassigned to serve as shuttles in the the-
ater. Aircraft arrive at the super node on transshipment or
direct delivery routes, because they rested there from last
period, are part of the theater’s shuttle ﬂeet, or because at
the beginning of the deployment they were assigned to the
theater. Constraints (4) and (5) are identical in form, but
the former accounts for aircraft on quickturn routes while
the latter tracks aircraft that recover at an APOD in the
theater. We distinguish between these two types of mis-
sions because of the differing ways that the aircraft con-
sume airﬁeld capacity; see the subsequent airﬁeld capacity
constraints in §2.12.












∀a ∈ Atkr  t ∈ T  (6)
TKRBCabt+TKRBabt=TKRCBabt+TKRBabt−1
∀a∈Atkr  b∈Btkr  t∈T  (7)
Constraint (6) models tanker aircraft reassignments. The
constraint may be viewed as an aircraft ﬂow balance con-
straint at a central control point, called the “tanker cloud.”
An aircraft must travel through the cloud in order to change
roles between serving as an aerial refueler and a cargo lifter
or when changing its beddown location as a refueler. The
left-hand side of (6) models aircraft ﬂying to the cloud and
the right-hand side models aircraft departing the cloud. We
use this modeling construct because it signiﬁcantly reduces
the number of decision variables over allowing all possible
point-to-point ﬂights. The number of tankers in the ﬂeet at
each tanker beddown base is tracked in constraint (7).






∀i∈ Ifob c∈C t∈TWi (8)
In each period, ﬂow balance is maintained for trans-
shipped cargo in each class for every line id by constraint
(8). The left-hand side represents the amount ﬂown into
the transshipment point by strategic lifters while the right-
hand side captures ﬂow to the ﬁnal destination by shuttle
aircraft or by ground transportation. Note that no explicit
geography is needed in this constraint because it is implicit
within the line id index i and enforced by the restriction of
allowable index combinations.
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∀a∈A b∈Bcrw t∈T \T  (9)
Each aircraft ﬂeet of type a has its own set of crews
and ﬂow balance of crews is maintained at each crew stage
base in constraint (9). The number of available crews in
period t+ 1 at b is the number available in t, plus crews
made available because they have rested sufﬁciently from
previous direct, transshipment, and backchannel missions,
less crews that depart in t on direct, transshipment, and
backchannel missions, plus the net number of crews made
available from tanker deployments and returns, plus the net
number of crews made available from shuttle deployments
and returns, plus additional crews that enter an APOE with
newly available aircraft, plus the net change in crews arriv-
ing and departing on deadhead missions.
2.7. Aircraft Delivery Capacity
Constraints (10), (11), and (12) are of identical form
and differ only in that they account for delivery capacity
for direct, transshipment, and shuttle ﬂights respectively.
purecapiac represents aircraft capacities if solely loaded
with cargo of type c from line id i; these ﬁgures are for
a 3,200 nm ﬂight. The effective capacity of the aircraft
is scaled by rangefaciar depending on the length of the
longest (critical) ﬂight leg on route r . These three sets of
constraints are supplemented by (13), (14), and (15) which
restrict the number of troops based on the aircraft’s seat-
ing conﬁgurations. paxfrac in (10)–(12) denotes the frac-
tion of the plane ﬁlled when its seats are ﬁlled with troops.
Note that DTONSiapax t represents numbers of troops while
DTONSiact for c ∈ bulk, oversized, outsized has units of
short tons.











rangefaciar · ,XDiar t−trvar +XDRiart−trvar -
∀ i ∈ I a ∈ A t ∈ TWi (10)











rangefaciar · ,XTiar t−trvar +XTRiar t−trvar -
∀ i ∈ Ifob a ∈ A t ∈ TW i (11)








 srangeia ·XSiat ∀ i ∈ Ifob a ∈ A t ∈ TWi (12)





maxpaxa · ,XDiar t−trvar +XDRiar t−trvar -
∀ i ∈ I a ∈ Amix t ∈ TW i (13)





maxpaxa · ,XTiar t−trvar +XTRiar t−trvar -
∀ i ∈ Ifob a ∈ Amix t ∈ TW i (14)
2.7.6. Shuttle Delivery Troop Capacity
STONSiapax t  maxpaxa ·XSiat
∀ i ∈ Ifob a ∈ Amix t ∈ TW i (15)
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∀b ∈ Barp t ∈ T  (18)
Constraint (16) restricts the number of shuttle missions
based on the size of the shuttle ﬂeet of type a aircraft at
time t in the theater associated with super node b. shutrateia
is the maximum number of roundtrip missions per period
that can be performed by aircraft a carrying line id i. The
number of tanker missions per period in each theater is
similarly constrained by (17). The number of aircraft ﬂying
on routes that use aerial refueling point b is constrained by
(18), based on the tankers serving b.
2.9. Initial Allocation of Aircraft and Crews
∑
b∈Be







= crewrata ·newacat ∀ a ∈ A t = 1 (20)
IRONTab+ IRONRab = initchopab
∀ a ∈ Achp b ∈ Bsup (21)
Constraint (19) governs the allocation of newly available
aircraft to embarkation bases. A similar function is per-
formed by (20) for allocating the crews to stage bases for
t = 1. In future time periods, new crews are allocated with
their aircraft; see constraint (9). For each super base, con-
straint (21) divides the initial shuttle ﬂeet among recovery
and nonrecovery bases in the theater.







































































cumacat ·uratea ∀ a∈A u∈U (22)
Based on historical data, an aircraft of type a can aver-
age only a certain number of ﬂight hours per day. These
averages capture a number of factors, such as aircraft relia-
bility, that are not directly modeled. See Wilson (1985) and
Gearing et al. (1988) for more detailed discussions of uti-
lization rates. We do not enforce the utilization limit on a
daily basis because that would be overconstraining. Rather,
we enforce it over blocks of time, denoted Tu for u ∈ U .
We use blocks with 20 days, and adjacent blocks have 10
days of overlap. ﬂttimearf speciﬁes the number of hours that
aircraft a is airborne in the f th period of its mission when
ﬂying route r . The left-hand side of (22) sums the ﬂight
times for all of the aircraft of type a within the block of
time periods speciﬁed by Tu. The sum over f ∈ FT cap-
tures all missions initiated in periods prior to t but not yet
complete by t.





























































hrsper ·cumacat ∀ a∈A t∈T  (23)
Constraint (23) has a similar mathematical structure to
the aircraft utilization constraint (22), but the multiplying
coefﬁcients in (23) are designed to capture all the time
consumed in period t by each aircraft activity, not just
the ﬂying time. The right-hand side of (23) is the total
number of hours available for aircraft of type a through
period t, and the left-hand side accounts for all possi-
ble aircraft activities through t (delivery ﬂights, shuttle
ﬂights, backchannel ﬂights, tanker missions, and aircraft
in inventory). Formulating the aircraft balance constraints
with travel times rounded down to an integer number of
periods can lead to overly optimistic results, and (23) helps
remedy this. See Morton et al. (1996) for supporting exper-
imental results. We note that if all of the travel times are
integer-valued, then (23) is redundant.
2.12. Airﬁeld Capacity Constraints







































































































dpcta ·gtimeabr ·acpkgab ·Yart−etrvabr (24o)
mogb ·mogeff b ∀ b∈B\Bsup\Barp t∈T 
The ability of airﬁelds to handle aircraft is captured in
two sets of constraints: (24) and (25). The ﬁrst set captures
parking ramp space and nonfuel related services, while
the second constrains throughput based on fuel limitations.
Even though ﬂow balance is only maintained at the the-
ater’s super node, these capacity constraints are enforced at
all “real” bases in the model, i.e., all modeled bases except
aerial refueling points, whose capacity is captured in (18),
and super nodes, which need no capacity constraints. The
amount of ground time, and hence airﬁeld capacity, that an
aircraft consumes depends on whether the base serves as
an onload, enroute, or ofﬂoad base for a strategic lifter.
Term (24a) captures ramp and service consumption at
enroute bases for standard and quickturn direct delivery
routes. Quickturn routes (24c) require minimal servicing at
the ofﬂoad base, and hence spend less time there than stan-
dard routes (24b). Terms (24d), (24e), and (24f) serve the
same purpose as (24a), (24b), and (24c) except that they
are for transshipment routes. Capacity is consumed by in-
theater shuttles at their FOBs and transshipment APODs
in (24g) and at their beddown base in (24h). Consump-
tion of ramp and service capacity for backchannel routes
is captured in (24i), and tanker aircraft consume capac-
ity at their beddown bases in (24j). Finally, in the model
a certain fraction of aerial refueling attempts fail and,
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as a result, associated cargo lifters are diverted to their
tanker’s beddown base and consume airﬁeld capacity there,
(24k)–(24o).

































































































dpcta · fuelabr ·Yar t−etrvabr
 fuelgalsb ∀ b ∈ B\Bsup\Barp t ∈ T  (25)
Constraint (25) is of very similar form to the ramp and
service consumption constraint (24), except here aircraft
consume gallons of fuel instead of parking-space hours.
Also, note that shuttle aircraft are fueled for an entire day
at their beddown base and so there is no analog of (24g)
in (25).
2.13. Initial Conditions
RONabt ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
XDiart ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
XTiart ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
Yart ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
THCHOPabt ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
TKRBabt ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
TKRBCabt ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
TKRECabt ≡ 0 ∀ t  0.
3. ANALYSES
In this section, we describe in some detail two studies in
which NRMO helped provide analyses to inform air mobil-
ity decisions. The ﬁrst study focuses on the impact of
enroute airﬁeld resources on the performance of the air-
lift system. The second study concerns ﬂeet moderniza-
tion, and NRMO was used to assess the system’s ability
to deliver cargo and troops under two ﬂeet alternatives.
The section concludes with a discussion of ongoing analy-
ses and computational requirements for some of our largest
model instances.
3.1. Analyzing the Effects of Airﬁeld
Resources on Airlift Capacity
The ability of an airlift system to deliver cargo and
passengers depends on a number of factors including
the ground resources available at airﬁelds. Stucker and
Williams (1998) performed a study of the impact of air-
ﬁeld resources on airlift capacity and we review some of
the results of their analysis here. This RAND study utilized
NRMO in conjunction with another model called the Air-
ﬁeld Capacity Estimator (ACE). ACE models parking and
servicing, loading and unloading, and fueling operations in
detail, and is described in Stucker et al. (1998). For our
purposes, we may view ACE as taking inputs that describe
an airﬁeld and its resources and providing for NRMO esti-
mates of aircraft ground times (gtimeabr and qtimeabr) and
airﬁeld capacities (mogb). We note that ACE allows for
several ground-servicing roles for an airﬁeld including the
notion of quickturn and recovery stops versus a full-service
ofﬂoad stop.
The primary purpose of Stucker and Williams’ study was
to investigate how the level of airﬁeld resources affects the
quantity of strategic airlift deliveries. The study’s sponsor,
the Force Projection Directorate in the Ofﬁce of the Secre-
tary of Defense (OSD), asked that a previously constructed
major regional contingency (MRC)-East deployment sce-
nario be used. In this scenario, cargo and passengers depart
the US from Dover, Delaware and are delivered to Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia via enroute bases in England, Germany, and
Spain. The relevant distances are shown in Table 3. Each
of these enroute bases actually has the combined resources
of two bases from their country. The English base has the
capability of Mildenhall and Fairford, the German base,
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Table 3. Distances in nautical miles between the three
enroute bases in Western Europe and the ori-
gin base in Dover, Delaware and the destina-
tion base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (Stucker
and Williams 1998).
Dover (nm) Dhahran (nm) Total (nm)
Mildenhall 3,123 2,953 6,076
Ramstein 3,437 2,765 6,202
Moron 3,213 2,879 6,092
Ramstein and Rhein Main, and the Spanish base, Moron
and Rota. Table 3 shows that the critical leg in each route
is the US-Europe leg. The route via England has the short-
est critical leg and the shortest overall distance. Politics
clearly plays an important role in such deployments, and
while NRMO contains little political modeling, the legs
between the English and German bases and the destination
base in Dhahran contain detours around Central and Eastern
Europe. The study uses the 1996 Air Mobility Command
ﬂeet of 95 C-5s, 18 C-17s, 174 C-141s, and 37 KC-10s
plus the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) of 64 wide-body
cargo planes (WBCs), 109 wide-body passenger planes
(WBPs), and 51 narrow-body cargo planes (NBCs). Under
the CRAF agreement, the Department of Defense leases
civilian passenger and cargo aircraft in times of national
emergency. The CRAF share resources with the military
aircraft at onload and ofﬂoad bases, but use separate non-
military enroute European bases. The focus of the study
concerns the role of enroute airﬁeld capacity at the mili-
tary European bases. The primary measure of effectiveness
RAND used in this analysis was average daily throughput
of cargo and passengers.
Under the baseline scenario using NRMO, all of the
passenger movements are completed within their allotted
time windows, with an average of 6,600 passengers deliv-
ered per day over the 30 day horizon used in this analysis.
All of the passengers are carried by CRAF aircraft. Over
30 days, 135,000 stons of cargo are delivered, an average
of 4,500 stons per day. The baseline scenario linear pro-
gram has 40,702 structural constraints, 112,944 decision
variables, and 907,340 nonzero constraint coefﬁcients. The
model solves in about 10 minutes on a Pentium III with
a 500 MHz processor using GAMS calling CPLEX 6.0’s
barrier algorithm.
3.1.1. The Impact of Existing Enroute Airﬁeld
Capacity. Three main types of airﬁeld resources are
considered: aircraft-speciﬁc maintenance, ramp space, and
fuel pumping rates. The supply of specialized aircraft ser-
vicing personnel is limited, and each type of aircraft may
not be able to be fully serviced at each enroute airﬁeld. To
capture this limitation the C-5, C-17, and C-141 service
personnel are each assigned to a different enroute base
and all of the associated ﬂights by, say, C-5 aircraft must
be routed through a unique enroute service center. The
KC-10’s service personnel are also assigned to one of the
Table 4. Existing airﬁeld ramp and fuel resources at the
three enroute bases. Ramp space is measured
in terms of narrow-body-equivalent parking
space hours per day. A narrow-body space
corresponds to that required by a C-141.
The C-17 and C-5 are wide-body aircraft
that require multiple narrow-body spaces. Fuel
pumping rates are in millions of gallons per
day (Stucker and Williams 1998).
Ramp Space (mogb)
(narrow-body-equivalent Fuel (fuelgalsb)




three enroute bases, so that particular base will handle two
types of aircraft. These aircraft-speciﬁc service personnel
restrictions are called “birds of a feather ﬂock together”
constraints. Ramp constraints impose a maximum number
of parking-space hours per day at each airﬁeld (mogb), and
fuel constraints limit the number of gallons of fuel that
can be pumped at an airﬁeld each day (fuelgalsb). Table 4
contains these values for the three enroute bases.
In order to assess the impact of each type of airﬁeld
capacity constraint, the model was run four times: (i) with
no airﬁeld capacity constraints, (ii) with just service cen-
ter (birds of a feather ﬂock together) restrictions, (iii)
with service center and ramp constraints, and (iv) with
service center, ramp, and fuel constraints. The service cen-
ter constraints are implemented using a mixed-integer pro-
gramming variant of NRMO in which 12 binary decision
variables were used to partition the C-5, C-17, and C-141
among the bases in England, Germany, and Spain, and also
assign the KC-10 to one of these three enroute bases. The
addition of the binary variables increased the run time for
this scenario from 10 minutes to two hours and 45 minutes.
Table 5 summarizes the results of these runs. When
no airﬁeld constraints are present, all aircraft are routed
through England since it has the shortest critical leg and
shortest overall length. When service center constraints are
enforced and the centers are allocated to the three enroute
bases, C-5s ﬂy through Spain, C-17s through Germany and
C-141s through England. Daily cargo deliveries decrease
by 100 stons, less than two percent, to about 5,600 stons
per day. This decrease is primarily due to increased ﬂying
times on the longer routes which result in fewer round trips
because of binding aircraft utilization constraints (§2.10).
Additional runs showed that these choices of the service
centers are not critical and similar results can be achieved
with other assignments. Imposing restrictions for ramp
space has a larger impact and average daily deliveries
decrease by 600 stons to 5,000 stons per day. The service
center constraints remain in place and C-5s still go through
Spain, saturating its ramp space from day 2 to day 30. The
C-17 and C-141 service centers swap locations. The C-17s,
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Table 5. This table shows the results of four runs with differing types of air-
ﬁeld capacity constraints enforced. Service center (birds of a feather ﬂock
together) constraints require that each type of aircraft be routed through
its unique enroute maintenance airbase. The location of the service cen-
ter is shown for each aircraft. Note that the average daily cargo deliv-
ered decreases as additional airﬁeld resource constraints are incorporated
(Stucker and Williams 1998).
Airﬁeld Capacity Constraints Present at Enroute Bases
None Service Service/Ramp Service/Ramp/Fuel
C-5 center England Spain Spain Germany
C-17 center England Germany England Spain
C-141 center England England Germany England
Daily Cargo (stons) 5,700 5,600 5,000 4,500
along with the small KC-10 ﬂeet, utilize all of the ramp
space at the English base on half of the days and utilize
it at over a 90% level every day. The C-141s use over
90% of the German base’s ramp space every day. Impos-
ing fuel pumping constraints also has a signiﬁcant impact,
decreasing average daily deliveries by another 500 stons to
the baseline result of 4,500 stons per day. In this case, the
locations of the service centers have all changed. This is
primarily driven by the relatively small fuel capacity of the
Spanish base. The smaller C-17 ﬂeet is now routed through
Spain and consumes its fuel supply each day. Ramp space
constrains C-5s in Germany and C-141s in England.
The results of systematically mislocating the specialized
aircraft service centers are shown in Table 6. Strategy A,
the optimal solution with all airﬁeld capacity constraints
enforced (the right-most column of Table 5) serves as the
baseline. Strategy B, with the C-5 center in Spain, the C-17
center in England, and the C-141 center in Germany leads
to a 2% reduction in daily deliveries. Strategy C leads to
nearly a 7% reduction, primarily because the large C-141
route is forced through the fuel-limited base in Spain.
In contrast to conclusions from some previous studies
(see the discussion in Stucker and Williams 1998), these
results indicate that airﬁeld capacity constraints at enroute
bases can play a critical role in an airlift system’s ability
to deliver cargo.
3.1.2. Redistributing Ramp Space and Fuel Pumping
Rates. At each of the three enroute bases, the fraction of
the airﬁeld as well as the fuel resources, accessible by the
US airlift aircraft may be negotiable. For this reason it can
be valuable to study optimal allocations of ramp space and
fuel pumping equipment. Stucker and Williams do so in the
following manner. They assume the ramp space and fuel
Table 6. Daily deliveries are shown under three strategies for locating the specialized
aircraft service centers at the enroute bases (Stucker and Williams 1998).
Strategy C-5 Center C-17 Center C-141 Center Daily Delivery (stons)
A Germany Spain England 4,500
B Spain England Germany 4,400
C England Germany Spain 4,200
totals over all three bases remain constant but they allow
redistribution among the three bases. The original and the
optimally redistributed values are shown in Table 7. The
redistribution yields a 12% increase in daily cargo deliver-
ies from 4,500 stons per day to 5,100 stons per day. Recall
that the case with no enroute airﬁeld capacity constraints
delivers 5,700 stons per day, so this redistribution results
in a signiﬁcant increase.
The C-5 is the largest aircraft, hauls the most cargo,
and consumes the most fuel. Its service center is relocated
in Spain where the redistribution increased both the ramp
space and fuel pumping rate. England now has more ramp
space to accommodate the wide-body C-17. Finally, the
ramp space and pumping rate in Germany are signiﬁcantly
reduced, but the base still has enough capacity to handle
82 narrow-body C-141s per day.
These results estimate that under this MRC-East scenario
if the US were to negotiate with its European allies in order
to redistribute existing ramp space and fuel pumping rates
in the recommended fashion, deliveries could be increased
by 12% over the ﬁrst 30 days of the deployment.
3.2. Fleet Modernization: Comparison
of NRMO with an Airlift Simulation
Concurrent with the RAND/OSD infrastructure analysis
described above, the Air Mobility Command’s Studies and
Analyses Flight (AMCSAF) at Scott AFB, Illinois, was
exploring alternatives for airlift ﬂeet modernization in the
next decade. AMCSAF conducted this study, as well as
all of its most detailed analyses, with a large simulation
model known as the Airlift Flow Module (AFM) of the
Mobility Analysis Support System (Air Mobility Com-
mand 1996). AFM is an established and respected model,
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Table 7. This table shows the original and redistributed ramp and fuel resources
among the three enroute bases. The resulting locations of the service centers
for each aircraft type are also shown. The NRMO model estimates that this
redistribution and relocation leads to a 12% increase in deliveries over the
ﬁrst 30 days of the deployment. Such insight is valuable because the US
may be able to negotiate the amount of airﬁeld capacity made available by
our NATO allies (Stucker and Williams 1998).
Ramp Space
(narrow-body-equivalent Fuel Pumping Rate
hours per day) (million gallons per day)
Airﬁeld Existing Preferred Existing Preferred Service Center
England 240 281 1.61 0.99 C-17
Germany 336 178 1.57 1.01 C-141
Spain 168 285 0.82 2.00 C-5
and so its results provided an opportunity to help validate
NRMO, as well as to compare and contrast the two mod-
eling approaches: optimization and simulation. Although it
has the capability to be run as a stochastic discrete-event
simulation, AFM is most often run as a deterministic sim-
ulation because of its computational requirements. In this
study AFM was run in its deterministic mode. Thus, the
purpose of using NRMO in the ﬂeet modernization study
was twofold: (i) to instill conﬁdence in, and familiarity
with, an optimization model for airlift mobility, and (ii) to
highlight additional insight that can be gleaned from an
alternative modeling approach to airlift mobility.
Simulation and optimization provide two of the most fre-
quently used modeling tools in operations research. Sim-
ulation models are descriptive, i.e., they characterize or
describe complex systems. And, simulation models can
incorporate details that are not possible to capture in a
mathematical program. On the other hand, optimization
models are prescriptive, i.e., they are typically used to
recommend a course of action. One important difference
between NRMO and AFM concerns the issue of schedul-
ing aircraft. NRMO assigns aircraft to routes each time
period in an optimal manner as prescribed by its objective
function. In contrast, AFM schedules aircraft in a relatively
myopic fashion. For each aircraft and origin-destination
pair, route priorities are speciﬁed ahead of time by a skilled
aviator-analyst using rules-of-thumb. When a mission is
to be scheduled, the simulation model chooses the high-
est priority route that has enough available resources (e.g.,
enroute airﬁeld capacity).
Any plan to modernize the airlift ﬂeet must consider sev-
eral wartime scenarios. Foremost among these scenarios
are a war near the Arabian peninsula (MRC-East), and a
war on the Korean peninsula (MRC-West). Although they
are only a small subset of the possible missions, these two
contingencies are among the most stressful from an air-
lift standpoint; both have huge delivery requirements, and
both are thousands of miles from the continental United
States. In this study, the onload, enroute, and ofﬂoad air-
base capacities were varied to reﬂect current infrastructure,
as well as the forecast infrastructure of the next decade.
Although AMCSAF modeled many ﬂeet alternatives using
AFM, we chose two of the leading contenders for the com-
parison with NRMO. Speciﬁcally, we assumed an unmod-
iﬁed C-5 ﬂeet of 95 aircraft, as well as an upgraded C-5
ﬂeet of the same size. The upgraded ﬂeet offered enhanced
reliability because of replaced engines, avionics, landing
gear, and some structural components. Increased reliability
is reﬂected in NRMO via larger uratea values and smaller
groundtime (gtimeabr and qtimeabr) values. Both ﬂeets also
included 95 C-17 aircraft, as well as 174 contracted CRAF
aircraft.
Commonality of input between the optimization and sim-
ulation models is very important, not only because this
allows direct comparison of the outputs, but because pro-
viding input data for large models is labor intensive. We
have developed a number of utilities that convert the estab-
lished AFM input ﬁles into NRMO input format. These
include the movement requirements, the aircraft capacities
for cargo types and classes, the airﬁeld locations and capac-
ities, and the available route structure. NRMO provides a
prescriptive solution at the expense of additional detail that
the descriptive simulation model (AFM) offers. To accom-
modate this reduced detail, the conversion utilities allow
the aggregation of similar movement requirements and air-
ﬁelds. For example, several small movement requirements
that have the same origins, destinations, time windows, and
cargo densities can be combined into one larger require-
ment with minimal loss of model ﬁdelity. Nearby airﬁelds
may be similarly aggregated.
Essentially four instances of NRMO were used in this
study: models for the Arabian peninsula and the Korean
peninsula, each under two ﬂeet conﬁgurations. All model
instances were built and solved on a Sun Ultra using
GAMS and calling CPLEX 3.0’s barrier algorithm. Each
model has 30 daily time periods and solves in less than 30
minutes. The dimensions of the linear programs are roughly
30,000 structural constraints, 110,000 decision variables,
and 900,000 nonzero constraint coefﬁcients.
3.2.1. Korean Peninsula. Airlift operations from the
United States to Korea are characterized by long overwater
ﬂights, stopovers in congested Japanese bases, and ofﬂoads
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Figure 4. Both the AFM airlift simulation model and
the NRMO airlift optimization model pre-
dict that similar amounts of cargo can be
delivered to the Korean peninsula during a
wartime contingency. Each bar shows the
delivered stons per day assuming the current
airbase infrastructure, as well as assuming
proposed infrastructure improvements for the
next decade. The two models differ some-
what regarding the effect of aircraft improve-
ments; AFM suggests that an additional 500
stons per day can be delivered using a ﬂeet
of improved C-5 cargo aircraft, while NRMO
suggests a much smaller improvement.
at small Korean airﬁelds with limited parking and servic-
ing capability. Most missions ﬂy a northern Paciﬁc route
through Alaska, or a mid-Paciﬁc route through Hawaii, and
sometimes Guam or Okinawa. Missions that originate on
the East coast or in the Midwest will also stop at an Air
Force base near Seattle or San Francisco. Because most
aircraft return to the U.S. empty, many of the eastbound
enroute stops are unnecessary, provided the aircraft is fully
fueled in Japan.
The results of the AFM simulation model and the NRMO
optimization model were similar with respect to average
daily cargo throughput. Figure 4 shows that both models
indicate a cargo throughput of just over 4,000 stons per
day using the current airﬁeld infrastructure, regardless of
whether the C-5 is modiﬁed or not. However, the simulation
was more sensitive to the modiﬁed C-5 than the optimiza-
tion. With modiﬁed C-5s and the proposed infrastructure,
AFM averaged 5,000 stons per day, while NRMO averaged
4,550 stons per day (500 stons per day is roughly equiv-
alent to 5 or 6 fully loaded C-5s, or 7 or 8 fully loaded
C-17s). It is likely that both models underestimate the con-
tribution of modiﬁed C-5s, since neither directly incorpo-
rates stochastic ground times due to aircraft reliability.
One of the most signiﬁcant insights gleaned from the
NRMO runs had nothing to do with comparing optimiza-
tion and simulation. Previous large-scale airlift analyses did
not account for the effects of wind, principally because
AFM did not use wind direction and velocity as an input.
In contrast, most human airlift planners routinely use a
west wind at 50 knots as a rough approximation of sum-
mertime winds at ﬂight level. In the jet stream, wintertime
winds in Northeast Asia are often 100 knots at cruising
altitude. When NRMO was run with 100 knot westerly
winds, daily cargo throughput dropped by an average of
15.6%. Thus, wind can have more effect on throughput than
either the proposed infrastructure or aircraft improvements!
Air Mobility Command is now incorporating wind into the
next AFM release. We note that Middleton (1998) develops
a stochastic variant of a deterministic optimization model
developed by Borsi and Whisman (1997). While this model
is simpler than NRMO in many respects, it uses multiple
scenarios to capture uncertainties in weather, as well as
maintenance and damage to airbases or planes by enemy
activities.
3.2.2. Arabian Peninsula. As described in the infras-
tructure study of §3.1, airlift deployments to the Arabian
peninsula involve at least one intermediate stop, usually in
England, Germany, or Spain. Fueling and servicing capa-
bility at the ofﬂoad locations, while generally less restric-
tive than in Korea, is still constrained. Additionally, the
political assumptions are trickier; permission to ﬂy over
any of the patchwork of countries in Europe is not assured,
and may change depending on who is ﬁghting whom. For
instance, the U.S. had very few overﬂight and enroute refu-
eling options during the resupply of Israel in the Yom
Kippur War of 1973, yet had numerous alternatives during
the Gulf War of 1990–91.
Our focus for NRMO in this study did not involve a
direct comparison with AFM. Rather, we wanted to show
how an optimization solution could complement a simula-
tion solution. We looked at route prioritization and ofﬂoad
airﬁeld congestion.
As indicated earlier, route priorities for each aircraft in
AFM must be speciﬁed by the user, whereas NRMO selects
an optimal route for a given time, aircraft, and unit deliv-
ered. As noted in the infrastructure study, making the best
match between routes and aircraft types is a function of the
critical leg as well as the airﬁeld capacities. Making inap-
propriate matches can be rather punitive. Similar to that
seen in the infrastructure study, the optimization preferred
and ﬂew C-17s on the route with the shortest critical leg
72% of the time, and the route with the longest critical
leg only 1% of the time. In order to reserve capacity at
the enroute airbases for C-17s, C-5 route preferences were
reversed; 29% of those missions ﬂew the shortest-critical-
leg route, while 40% ﬂew the longest-critical-leg route.
These frequencies, which are output from NRMO, were
consistent with the priority lists constructed by USAF ana-
lysts for input for AFM. That is, the most frequently used
routes in NRMO corresponded the highest priority routes in
AFM. If NRMO’s output turned out to be inconsistent with
the analyst’s priority list, then the frequencies with which
NRMO chose routes could be used to suggest a priority list
for AFM.
Determining where to spend additional infrastructure
dollars is essentially a byproduct of any NRMO run.
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Table 8. Average daily deliveries of cargo and troops for the NRMO optimization
model and the AFM simulation model are compared under two scenarios
for the fuels infrastructure study.
West 2006 East 2006
Fuels Infrastructure
Study NRMO AFM %Diff NRMO AFM %Diff
Daily cargo (stons) 4,859 4,750 2% 5,514 5,090 8%
Daily troops 7,661 6,965 10% 7,011 6,788 3%
Although not a goal of the ﬂeet modernization analy-
sis, examination of the Arabian peninsula dual solutions
showed a large range of airbase congestion, as indicated
by the ofﬂoad bases’ airﬁeld parking capacity constraints.
The optimal dual variable levels ranged from an average of
only 26.1 stons delivered per parking space per day, up to
104.4 stons delivered per parking space per day. Marginal
analysis from NRMO dual solutions provided additional
insight that was unavailable from AFM.
3.2.3. Other NRMO-AFM Comparative Analyses.
Since the completion of the analyses described above, the
NRMO model has continued to be used in the analysis of
infrastructure and ﬂeet issues. Two additional studies, both
sponsored by the Force Projection Directorate in OSD are
in progress at the time this paper is being written.
The purpose of the ﬁrst study is to prioritize spend-
ing on several proposed fuel system improvements at air
mobility bases around the world. Fuel infrastructure in the
Paciﬁc and Europe is crucial for the support of deliveries
to Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia, two areas of pos-
sible future conﬂict. Much of the available infrastructure
in these areas, especially in the Paciﬁc, is aging and in
need of repair. This fuels infrastructure study, performed
by Thomas et al. (1999) at RAND, is complementary to
work done at AMCSAF using AFM. As a part of the anal-
ysis, the RAND team performed a detailed comparison of
NRMO and AFM results for the baseline versions of two
scenarios. The comparison included analyses of deliveries,
missions ﬂown, average payloads, and aircraft cycle times.
In response to the analyses, NRMO was improved to cap-
ture additional details of the air mobility system, such as
home station servicing and aircraft load factors, which were
represented in the AFM simulation. The results of the com-
parison are summarized in Table 8.
The purpose of the second study, performed at the Naval
Postgraduate School by Baker et al. (2000) is to determine
the requirements for USAF tanker aircraft in future years.
These requirements have changed markedly in the post-
cold war world. Classically used to support nuclear bomber
refueling, tanker requirements in the 1990s have focused
more on deployment and employment of airlift and ﬁghter
assets to other contingencies. Recognizing this evolution of
requirements, AMCSAF is currently conducting the Tanker
Requirements Study for 2005 (TRS-05) using AFM and
other models. Although the simulation and optimization
efforts are not completely parallel, the analyses will begin
from several common baseline scenarios. To date, only the
Table 9. This table compares the output of the NRMO
optimization model and the AFM simulation
model for one scenario of the tanker require-
ments study.
West-East
TRS-05 NRMO AFM %Diff
Daily cargo (stons) 4,950 4,575 8%
Daily troops 9,025 8,400 7%
dual MRC West-to-East scenario has been implemented for
NRMO. Preliminary analysis shows that NRMO results are
comparable to AFM results for this scenario, as indicated
in Table 9.
The differences between the delivery capabilities sug-
gested by NRMO and AFM in these two studies are
consistent with those found in the ﬂeet modernization anal-
yses described in §§3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Also, the two studies
sketched in this section use large MRC-sized scenarios that
have minimal aggregation. Therefore, the model instances
and solution times arising from these analyses provide a
good indication of the computational effort required to
solve some of the largest model instances we have faced.
The sizes of these instances, associated run times, and other
related data are given in Table 10. The fuels infrastructure
study runs were made on a Sun Ultra2 with two 300 MHz
Table 10. This table shows the numbers of bases,
routes, time periods, and the number of
demand requirements in the TPFDD for
model instances from the fuels infrastructure
and tanker requirements studies. “Rows” and
“Columns” specify the number of structural
constraints and decision variables respec-
tively, while “Nonzeros” shows the number
of nonzero constraint coefﬁcients.
Fuels Infrastructure TRS-05
West 2006 East 2006 West/East
Bases 37 41 68
TPFDD lines 250 191 204
Routes 79 48 289
Time periods 45 45 90
Rows 71346 63001 108967
Columns 428901 402082 373022
Nonzeros 7663812 6917393 3753174
Solve time 2.5 hrs 2.0 hrs 2.0 hrs
Baker, Morton, Rosenthal, and Williams / 601
RISC processors using GAMS calling the parallel CPLEX
6.0 barrier algorithm. The TRS-05 runs were done on a
Pentium III with a 500 MHz processor using GAMS calling
the CPLEX 6.0 barrier method.
4. SUMMARY
In recent years, the US military has repostured from a
forward-deployed force countering relatively few areas of
likely conﬂict, to a largely US-based force reacting to many
disparate smaller conﬂicts. The resulting burdens on the
strategic airlift force have become acute, and have been the
subject of numerous analyses for updated aircraft, infra-
structure, and concepts of operation.
NRMO has played a signiﬁcant role in the conduct of
these analyses, as it was designed to model the deliv-
ery of troops and cargo in the early stages of a conﬂict.
NRMO grew out of the combined advantages of several
optimization models (MOM, THRUPUT, THRUPUT II and
CONOP). NRMO and its progenitors have been used to
assist USAF planners in analyzing important issues con-
cerning ﬂeet modernization and aircraft acquisition, invest-
ment and divestment in airﬁeld resources, and how to best
use aircraft that may be utilized in multiple roles. Because
NRMO has been developed over several years and utilized
in multiple analyses, we have simultaneously streamlined
the model for computational efﬁciency and expanded it to
include many of the key features of the airlift system. We
believe it has been instrumental in identifying key areas for
improvement of this critical national resource.
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